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Ebolavirus causes a severe haemorrhagic fever in humanswith high case fatality
and significant epidemic potential. The 2013–2016 outbreak in West Africa was
unprecedented in scale, being larger than all previous outbreaks combined,with
28 646 reported cases and 11 323 reported deaths. It was also unique in its geo-
graphical distribution and multicountry spread. It is vital that the lessons
learned from the world’s largest Ebola outbreak are not lost. This article aims
to provide a detailed description of the evolution of the outbreak.We contextua-
lize this outbreak in relation to previous Ebola outbreaks and outline the theories
regarding its origins and emergence. The outbreak is described by country, in
chronological order, including epidemiological parameters and implementation
of outbreak containment strategies. We then summarize the factors that led to
rapid and extensive propagation, as well as highlight the key successes, failures
and lessons learned from this outbreak and the response.
This article is part of the themed issue ‘The 2013–2016 West African
Ebola epidemic: data, decision-making and disease control’.
1. Introduction
Ebola virus is a member of the Filoviridae family. There are five strains that have
been identified: Zaire, Sudan, Bundibugyo, Taı¨ Forest and Reston. The first three
cause the majority of disease in humans with case fatality rates ranging from
25% to 90% [1–3]. Both Taı¨ Forest and Reston Ebola virus cause diseases in non-
human primates, but infections in humans are limited to one case of Taı¨ Forest
Ebola virus and largely asymptomatic infections with Reston Ebola virus [4].
Ebola viruses have significant epidemic potential, as shown by the 2013–2016
WestAfricanoutbreak.Causedby theZaire strain, this outbreakwasunprecedented
in scale, being larger than all other outbreaks combined, with 28 646 reported cases
(confirmed, probable and suspected) and11 323 reporteddeaths [5]. ThisEbolaout-
breakwas the first to lead to amajor globalpublic health threat and the first inwhich
the virus spread across multiple international boundaries.
Although Ebola is known to cause outbreaks in central and eastern Africa, no
sporadic human cases or outbreaks had previously been reported in West Africa.
Notwithstanding this, there was a major outbreak in 1994 among non-human pri-
mates in Cote d’Ivoirewith one veterinarian subsequently infected. Because of this,
in the early phase of theWestAfrican outbreakEbolawas not considered as a differ-
ential diagnosis, with Lassa fever—another viral haemorrhagic fever that is known
to occur in humans in West Africa—being considered a more likely cause.
The widespread nature of the West African outbreak is thought to be related
to the highly mobile communities and densely populated regions affected in the
early stages of the outbreak. Previous outbreaks had been limited to remote, rural
areas allowing initial containment efforts to be more effective. The majority of
cases in the West African outbreak were localized to three countries with intense
transmission: Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea. Seven other countries had minor
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outbreaks with non-sustained transmission or isolated cases,
all with origins attributable to West Africa: Nigeria, Mali,
Senegal, Spain, the UK, the USA and Italy. Other countries
also accepted evacuated cases from West Africa for hospitaliz-
ation, including Germany, France, Switzerland, the
Netherlands and Norway.
This article details the evolution of the 2013–2016 West
African outbreak and aims to summarize the events by
country in chronological order. The landscape of previous
Ebola outbreaks is described in order to highlight differences
and we summarize theories about the origins of the 2013–
2016 outbreak, as well as the factors that led to outbreak
propagation. Finally, we review and discuss the key
successes, failures and lessons learned from this outbreak.
2. Previous Ebola outbreaks
There have been 29 outbreaks or case reports of Ebola virus dis-
ease (EVD) reported since Ebola was first identified in 1976
(table 1). The majority of human disease has arisen from 15 out-
breaks caused by the Zaire strain and eight by the Sudan strain.
These outbreaks and cases were limited to rural communities in
Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Republic of
Congo, Gabon and Uganda. Most of these outbreaks were
small in size with just seven outbreaks involving more than 100
cases. The largest of the outbreaks before 2013 occurred in
Uganda in 2000–2001 with 425 cases and 224 deaths (Sudan
strain) and DRC (Kikwit) in 1995 with 315 cases and 250 deaths
(Zaire strain) [6].
The first documented outbreak of Ebola occurred in 1976 in
northern Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo).
It occurred in and around a mission hospital in Yambuku,
adjacent to the Ebola River after which the virus was named.
In total, 318 cases were identified with a case fatality of 88%
[2]. Nosocomial transmission played a significant role in this
first outbreak, as it would in future Ebola outbreaks, during
which the reuse of contaminated needles in the local hospital
was found to be themajor factor in the initial spread of the virus.
Two months prior to the outbreak in Zaire in 1976 a similar
outbreak occurred in the south of Sudan, which initially did
not attract international attention [7]. The Sudan outbreak origi-
nated in a cotton factory in Nzara and was amplified by
transmission in a local hospital in Maridi, both of which were
close to the borderwithZaire.Owing to the proximityof the sub-
sequent outbreak in Zaire, these two outbreaks were initially
thought to be linked. However, they were subsequently found
to be caused by two different strains of Ebola virus later named
Zaire and Sudan strains respectively. A total of 284 cases were
identified in theSudaneseoutbreakwith acase fatalityof 53% [8].
An additional strain, Reston Ebola virus, was first ident-
ified in the USA in monkeys imported from the Philippines
in 1989. The virus was transmitted to humans working
with the chimpanzees, as shown by an antibody response.
Although none showed classical symptoms of EVD (box 1),
mild fever and non-specific symptoms were reported. This
strain has also been identified in pigs with asymptomatic
transmission to at least six humans in contact with pigs
reported in the Philippines [6].
Table 1. Previous Ebola outbreaks/infections in humans. (Adapted from CDC [6].)
year countries no. outbreaks no. cases no. deaths viral strain
1970–1979 Zaire, 1976a 2 319 281 Zaire
Sudan, 1976b 2 318 173 Sudan
United Kingdom, 1976 1 1 0 Sudan
1980–1989 Philippines, 1989–1990 1 3c 0 Reston
1990–1999 USA, 1990 1 4c 0 Reston
Gabon, 1994 3 149 97 Zaire
Coˆte d’Ivoire, 1994d 1 1 0 Taı¨ Forest
DRC, 1995 1 315 250 Zaire
Gabon/South Africa, 1996e 1 2 1 Zaire
Russia, 1996 1 1 1 Zaire
2000–2009 Uganda, 2000–2001 2 574 261 Sudan/Bundibugyo
Gabon, 2001–2002 1 65 53 Zaire
Republic of Congo, 2001–2002 3 235 200 Zaire
Sudanb, 2004 1 17 7 Sudan
Russia, 2004 1 1 1 Zaire
DRC, 2007 2 296 202 Zaire
Philippines, 2008 1 6c 0 Reston
2010–2013 Uganda, 2011–2013 3 18 8 Sudan
DRC, 2012 1 36 13 Bundibugyo
aNow Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
bNow South Sudan.
cAsymptomatic infection.
dPatient was hospitalized in Basel, Switzerland for medical treatment.
eIndex case infected in Gabon, admitted to hospital in South Africa for treatment and subsequently infected a nurse.
rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org
Phil.Trans.R.Soc.B
372:20160297
2
 on March 6, 2018http://rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org/Downloaded from 
Box 1. Ebola virus disease—key facts about the virus, illness, management and prevention. (Adapted from CDC [9].)
† Outbreak emergence
— EVD is a zoonotic infection—outbreaks begin in humans following a spillover event from an animal to human.
— The animal reservoir for Ebola remains uncertain, but current evidence suggests that bat species may be a natural reservoir,
with other species acting as intermediate hosts, particularly non-human primates [10]. The evidence to support this includes:
(i) Experimental inoculation of animals epidemiologically linked with outbreaks of Ebola virus demonstrated viral
replication in fruit and insectivorous bats without fatalities [11]
(ii) Trapping studies have found wild bats with evidence of Ebola infection and immunity (RNA fragments and
Ebola-specific antibodies) in areas which have had human and non-human primate Ebola outbreaks [12]. However,
live Ebola virus has never been isolated from a bat in nature, which makes the picture less clear [13]
(iii) Ebola virus has been isolated from other animals, including non-human primates and duikers, but these species
appear to be unsuitable reservoirs because they have high case fatality rates during outbreaks [10,13].
— Bats have been suggested as a possible source for the 2013–2016 epidemic, based on retrospective epidemiological data:
(i) Interviews with contacts of the index case in Guinea indicated that the two-year old child regularly played near a tree
found to house a colony of insectivorous bats [14].
(ii) The species of bats known to carry Ebola virus were identified close to where the index case lived.
(iii) No evidence of Ebola virus infection was found in specimens obtained from bats in this area based on RT-PCR and
serology assays (n¼169 specimens) [14].
† Disease transmission
— Outbreaks of EVD are thought to originate when the index case becomes infected through contact with the body fluids of
an infected animal. Once the index case becomes ill or dies, the virus spreads to others who come into direct contact with
the blood or body fluids of the infected person.
— Individuals are only considered to be infectious when symptomatic (not when asymptomatic during the incubation period).
— Multiple estimates of the basic reproductive number, R0, have been carried out for the 2013–2016 epidemic. R0 is defined as the
number of secondary cases that arise from a primary case in a completely susceptible population. In Guinea, estimates ranged
from 1.5 to 1.71, compared to 1.36 and 1.83 in Liberia, and estimates ranged more widely from 1.4 to 2.53 in Sierra Leone [15].
† Clinical presentation
— Incubation period: 2-21 days (mean 11.4 days) between infection and symptom onset during this 2013-2016 outbreak [16].
This is similar to previous reports.
— Symptoms:
(i) Most cases of EVD begin with the abrupt onset of fever and malaise.
(ii) There is a broad spectrum of symptom presentation from very mild to severe haemorrhagic complications (rare).
(iii) Common early symptoms include headache, vomiting, diarrhoea, myalgia, rash, and hiccups, and can then lead to
haemorrhagic symptoms, uveitis, conjunctival injection and neurological symptoms (meningoencephalitis with
altered consciousness, neck stiffness, and seizures).
(iv) Gastrointestinal symptoms are very common and can lead to significant fluid loss and electrolyte disturbance leading
to hypovolaemic shock or arrhythmias and sudden death.
(v) Traditionally, haemorrhagic symptoms were thought to be the defining feature and indeed EVD was previously
named ‘Ebola haemorrhagic fever’, but major haemorrhages are not seen in the majority of patients, although a
degree of bleeding (blood in stool, petechiae, ecchymoses, oozing from venepuncture sites, and mucosal bleeding)
can occur. Significant bleeding is seen in the terminal phase of some cases and in pregnancy.
— Most patients who survive EVD show signs of improvement during the second week of illness.
† Investigations
— Testing for the presence of Ebola virus is by reverse-transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR).
— Other laboratory findings associated with EVD include leukopenia, thrombocytopenia, serum transaminase elevations
(secondary to multifocal hepatic necrosis), decreased serum albumin, elevated amylase, electrolyte disturbances, renal
and coagulation abnormalities.
— Testing to exclude other differential diagnoses of febrile illnesses should also be undertaken. This is particularly relevant
for patients who are PCR-negative, but should be done, where possible in all cases, to exclude comorbidity; malaria
coinfection, for example, is not uncommon.
† Treatment
— Early diagnosis is essential in order to initiate treatment and institute strict infection control.
— There are no approved therapies and management is largely supportive. Maintaining fluid balance with electrolyte replen-
ishment, empirical antibiotics and anti-diarrhoeal agents are important. The use of non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs
and vitamin K remains contentious. Different protocols exist across different settings and organizations.
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In 1994, the Taı¨ Forest Ebola virus was reported to cause an
outbreak among chimpanzees in Cote d’Ivoire. A veterinarian
studying the outbreak was subsequently infected following
post-mortem examinations on the infected chimpanzees [18].
She is the only known human to have been infected with this
strain andsurvivedafter beinghospitalized inBasel, Switzerland.
The Bundibugyo strain was responsible for two outbreaks
in Uganda in 2007 and Democratic Republic of Congo in
2012. The Ugandan outbreak resulted in 131 cases and
appears to have the lowest mortality (32%) of all viral strains
that cause EVD in humans [6].
In August 2014, during the height of West African out-
break, a case of EVD was confirmed in rural Jeera County,
DRC (Zaire strain). Sequencing data showed the two out-
breaks to be unrelated, with the index case identified as a
pregnant woman infected after contact with bush meat. The
scale of this outbreak was in keeping with pre-2013
outbreaks, with 66 reported cases and 49 deaths [19].
In addition to the outbreaks described here, isolated indi-
vidual human cases have been reported including imported
cases from Gabon to Johannesburg, South Africa (Zaire
strain) and three laboratory accidents—one in the United
Kingdom (Sudan strain) and two in Russia (Zaire strain).
Of note is the discovery that, although there are no previous
reports of EVDoutbreaks inWestAfrica, retrospective testing of
archived clinical samples during the 2013–2016 outbreak
revealed EVD was causing clinical symptoms in Sierra Leone
as early as 2006 [20].
3. Ebola virus disease: clinical picture
While the focus of this article is not the clinical presentation
and management of persons with Ebola virus infection, we
highlight the key details of EVD in box 1 in order to help con-
textualize the infection and outbreak response. This includes
a summary of clinical presentation as well as strategies for
diagnosis, management and prevention.
4. Outbreak evolution
The outbreak began in Guinea with the first case retrospec-
tively identified as having occurred in late 2013 and spread
to several other countries, with Sierra Leone and Liberia
most severely affected. The evolution of the 2013–2016
West African outbreak is described below in chronological
order, by country. Figure 1 documents a timeline of the
major outbreak events in each of the three main affected
countries, including epidemic curves. Figure 2 shows a
map of the three countries in West Africa with intense trans-
mission, to help visualize the geographical spread outlined.
Table 2 shows a summary of basic country statistics pre-
Ebola. Box 2 highlights key outbreak-related definitions
used throughout the paper.
(a) Guinea
On 10 March 2014, the Ministry of Health in Guinea was
alerted to an outbreak of a mysterious disease character-
ized by fever, severe diarrhoea, vomiting and a high
fatality rate in the prefectures (regions) of Gue´cke´dou and
Macenta in southeast Guinea (figure 2).1 Two days later,
Me´decin Sans Frontie`res (MSF), which had worked in the
region primarily on malaria projects since 2010, was also
notified. A team sent by the Ministry of Health reached the
outbreak area on 14 March, with a European MSF team arriv-
ing on 18 March. Epidemiological investigation and blood
samples (sent to the biosafety level 4 laboratories in Lyon,
France and Hamburg, Germany) confirmed EVD. The
WHO subsequently announced an Ebola outbreak on 23
March 2014 [26–28].
Retrospective analyses traced the source of the outbreak
to Meliandou village within the prefecture of Gue´cke´dou,
in the forested region of southeastern Guinea that borders
both Sierra Leone and Liberia. The suspected index case
was a two-year old child who fell ill on 2 December
2013 and died 4 days later [29]. A second epidemiological
investigation confirmed the source village and index case,
but the date of death of the index case was documented
as the end of December 2013. Other family members
rapidly became unwell and died between 13 December
2013 and 1 January 2014 (the index case’s mother, sister,
and grandmother). A village midwife who cared for the
index case during his illness also fell ill—during her hospi-
talization in the nearest town, Gue´cke´dou, she likely
infected another healthcare worker (HCW) who was hospi-
talized in Macenta Hospital and is thought to have
— Despite no licensed treatment options, significant progress was made during the outbreak with 15 experimental therapies
trialled on humans. These include blood products e.g. convalescent plasma, immunological agents (e.g. monoclonal anti-
bodies (e.g. ZMapp)), and antiviral drug therapies (e.g. Favipiravir and novel agents (TKM0120803)) [17]. In addition, the
efficacy of vaccine candidates was also studied.
† Preventative strategies
Strategies to prevent transmission of Ebola virus during an outbreak include:
— Infection control (including patient isolation) and sterilization including careful hand hygiene (wash hands with soap and
water or an alcohol-based sanitizer), avoidance of contact with blood and body fluids of Ebola patients (e.g. urine, faeces,
saliva, sweat, urine, vomit, breast milk, semen, and vaginal fluids), and avoidance of all items in contact with infected
patients (e.g. bedding, needles/medical equipment)
— Use of personal protective equipment where appropriate
— Contact tracing and fever surveillance of all contacts with quarantine where required
— Safe burial - avoiding rituals that require washing or handling of the body of an Ebola patient
— Safe sex advice
— Engaging communities in preventing transmission
— Vaccination strategies (although no vaccine is currently licensed and this would not prevent random emergence events).
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Figure 1. Timeline of key events with country-specific epidemic curves. Case numbers are total reported confirmed, probable, and suspected cases provided in WHO
situation reports throughout the epidemic. We have calculated weekly case number (Monday–Sunday). Asterisk indicates where negative case numbers are reported
(as per WHO data) when suspected/probable cases subsequently test negative for Ebola PCR or as a result of data errors. MOH, Ministry of Health; MSF, Me´decins
Sans Frontie`res; ETCs, Ebola treatment centres. Where events happened multiple times, only the first occurrence has been shown.
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triggered the spread of the infection to a larger town. The
midwife also had epidemiological links to cases in villages
around Gue´cke´dou prefecture (Dandou Pombo, Dawa and
Gbandou Villages) between January and March 2014. The
initial case fatality rate was 86% (12 of the 14 original
patients with a known outcome died). Baize et al. reported
this initial transmission chain in October 2014, and an
adaptation of the initial transmission tree is shown in
figure 3.
Between December 2013 and the identification of
Ebola virus as the infectious agent at the end of March
2014, a total of 49 cases met the case definition for EVD,
with 111 clinically suspected cases and 79 deaths attributed
to EVD on the basis of clinical symptoms. The cases were
recorded in the prefectures of Gue´cke´dou, Macenta and
Kissidougou.
The first cases in the capital city, Conakry, were detected
in March 2014. However, it was not until May 2014 that sus-
tained transmission in Conakry was documented. Conakry is
a city of approximately two million inhabitants located in the
west of the country on the coast, approximately 400 km from
Meliandou [27]. While most districts had a peak or peaks of
infection, both Gue´cke´dou and Conakry had fairly consistent
levels of transmission spanning the majority of the outbreak
period in Guinea.
By May 2014, the number of cases appeared to be declin-
ing in the initial epicentre leading to an MSF treatment
facility in Macenta being closed. New cases continued to be
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reported in other parts of the country, but these were attrib-
uted to introductions from Sierra Leone and Liberia. In
time it became apparent that case numbers had not fallen;
instead cases had been hidden owing to a number of conspi-
racy theories which arose when patients were taken to Ebola
treatment centres (ETCs) and died there. In September 2014,
one newspaper reported that ‘many Guineans say local and
foreign HCWs are part of a conspiracy which either deliber-
ately introduced the outbreak, or invented it as a means of
luring Africans to clinics to harvest their blood and organs’
[31]. Furthermore, traditional burial practices were forbidden
to reduce exposure to infected bodies (box 3). However, this
violation of cultural beliefs bred fear that the deceased and
their relatives would be cursed for failing to perform a
proper ceremony. The unfamiliar sight of workers wearing
full protective clothing heightened tensions; fear reached a
climax when riots broke out in N’Ze´re´kore´ after rumours
spread that medics disinfecting a market were in fact con-
taminating people [34]. Tragically, in September 2014 eight
members of a healthcare team were murdered by residents
of Womey near N’Ze´re´kore´ [34–36].
Data during this early phase of the outbreak were irregu-
larly collected and resources were focused on providing
clinical care. Despite multiple requests from MSF and other
agencies working in the country, it was not until 8 August
2014 that the WHO declared the outbreak a public health
emergency of international concern. The President of
Guinea, Alpha Conde, followed suit, declaring a national
health emergency. Containment efforts included automatic
admission to hospital for suspected cases, compulsory quar-
antining of Ebola contacts, travel restrictions including
enhanced border controls, and preventing dead bodies
being transported between towns (common for cultural repa-
triation). Contravening these restrictions would be subject to
law enforcements [37].
Despite the increased international support that fol-
lowed these pronouncements, weekly confirmed case
numbers remained stubbornly between 75 and 148 between
September and December 2014 [5]. In early October MSF
reported a spike in cases in the capital, Conakry, with
one treatment centre receiving 22 patients in a single day.
As a result, the governor of Conakry banned all cultural
celebrations for Eid [38,39].
During October, districts which were previously disease-
free started reporting cases including Lola, Kankan and
Faranah districts [5]. Transmission in Kankan and Faranah
districts was of particular concern owing to their proximity
to national borders; Kankan is adjacent to Coˆte d’Ivoire and
forms part of the major trade route to Mali, whereas Faranah
district neighbours Koinadugu in Sierra Leone, which was
also beginning to report cases. The potential cross-border
transmission highlighted the need for national border
surveillance.
On 23 October 2014, the government of Guinea
announced that they had started compensating the families
of HCWs who died of EVD with a lump sum payment of
$10 000 to each family. Prior to that date, 42 cases of HCW
occupation-related death had been reported [40].
Intense transmission persisted through November and
December. Concerns were raised on 20 November 2014
when the Red Cross sent blood samples to a testing centre
via courier taxi. The taxi was robbed near the town of Kissi-
dougou with the robbers unwittingly stealing the cooler bag
with the infected blood. Despite public appeals, the samples
were never recovered [41].
By mid-December 2014, cases were reported in the north-
ern district of Siguiri bordering Mali [5] and, one month later,
the virus had spread to the western district of Fria for the
first time. In all, 19 districts were reporting transmission
events on a weekly basis and transmission in the capital
remained high [5].
All countries struggled to provide the necessary bed
capacity to isolate and treat all confirmed, probable, and sus-
pected cases of Ebola, particularly in the early phases of the
outbreak. In total, Guinea had nine ETCs during the out-
break. The first ETCs to be established were run by MSF
and the French Red Cross, with many other organizations
forming crucial collaborations and providing resources and
staff. The largest ETC was the first one in Gue´cke´dou,
which had a maximal capacity of 170 beds. Other centres
included Macenta, Conakry (Donka Hospital), Coyah,
Beyla, N’Ze´re´kore´, Kerouane, Wonkifong, and Kankan [42].
Setting up an ETC was a huge undertaking and took time,
meaning that demand rarely coincided with supply.
The number of new reported infections began to fall in
early January 2015 to approximately 50 cases per week,
although this continued to fluctuate [5]. Throughout Febru-
ary and March transmission was concentrated in the
western districts including Conakry, Coyah, and Forecariah.
The latter borders Kambia in Sierra Leone which was, by
that time, in the midst of its own outbreak (see below).
These last two districts (named above) were alone responsible
for 46% of the weekly new case counts across all three West
African countries towards the end of March 2015 [5].
Table 2. Basic country statistics from the three main affected countries. (Adapted from World Bank data, 2014, unless otherwise stated [22,23].)
country statistic Guinea Liberia Sierra Leone
population 12.3 million 4.4 million 6.3 million
rural population (% of total) 63.3 50.7 60.4
gross domestic product per capita (US$) 539.6 457.9 792.6
capital city Conakry Monrovia Freetown
physicians per 1000 people (as of 2010) 0.1 0.014 0.022
total number of reported Ebola cases† (WHO 2013–2016) 3811 10 678 14 124
total number of Ebola deaths (WHO 2013–2016) 2543 4810 3956
†conﬁrmed, probable, and suspected cases reported by WHO.
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Box 2. Outbreak-related definitions used.
† WHO case definitions used during an outbreak [24]
Suspected case
Any person, alive or dead, suffering or having suffered from a sudden onset of high fever and having had contact with:
— a suspected, probable or confirmed Ebola case,
— a dead or sick animal.
Any person with sudden onset of high fever and at least three of the following:
— headaches — anorexia — stomach pain
— vomiting — diarrhoea — lethargy
— myalgia or arthralgia — difficulty swallowing — difficulty breathing
— hiccups
Any person with inexplicable bleeding;
Or any sudden, inexplicable death.
Probable case
Any suspected case evaluated by a clinician; any deceased suspected case having an epidemiological link with a
confirmed case (where it is not possible to collect samples for laboratory confirmation).
Confirmed case
Laboratory-confirmed cases: any suspected or probable cases testing positive for the virus (virus RNA by reverse tran-
scriptase-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) or IgM antibodies against Ebola).
N.B. In this paper the use of ‘case’ or ‘case number’ refers to the total reported confirmed, probable, and suspected cases
provided in WHO situation reports throughout the epidemic.
† WHO criteria for declaring the end of the Ebola outbreak [25]
End of Ebola outbreak: 42 day count
The outbreak is considered ended in a country after 42 days have passed since the last confirmed case has met one of three
criteria:
— been isolated, recovered and subsequently tested negative for the virus on two blood samples (collected at an inter-
val of at least 48 hours)
— been isolated and subsequently died in an ETC with a safe burial organized by the ETC. The 42 day count begins
on the day following burial
— the case was a contact of a confirmed Ebola case. He/she died and was buried in the community and was either a
confirmed case or a probable case. The 42 day count begins on the day following burial.
The outbreak in the West Africa subregion was declared over when the 42 day period elapsed in the last affected country.
The rationale for 42 days is based on twice the maximum incubation period for Ebola, as this can be expected to confirm
the interruption of human-to-human transmission chains.
During the 42 day period each country should:
— ensure active case finding around confirmed cases and transmission chains
— implement both active and passive surveillance for EVD (e.g. through regular health facility visits and by main-
taining a nationwide system of alerts and signals)
— conduct post-mortem testing for EVD following deaths in the community
— offer testing of semen samples among survivors and, for those who test positive, monthly testing thereafter until
two negative results are obtained
— ensure screening of blood donors and products
— sentinel surveillance among patients with febrile illness.
90 day heightened surveillance period
After the 42 day period has elapsed, each country should maintain a system of heightened surveillance for a further 90
days, ensuring ongoing EVD surveillance and notification. During this time a combination of active and passive surveil-
lance should be maintained, ideally integrated with surveillance for other important epidemic-prone diseases. Post-
mortem testing and testing of survivor semen samples should also be continued for 90 days. Passive surveillance
should then be continued indefinitely and EVD preparedness plans should be in place and monitored in all countries
previously affected by EVD.
The rationale for 90 days of heightened surveillance is due to:
— the continued risk of new importations of EVD within the West Africa sub-region, given the outbreak occurred in
multiple countries
rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org
Phil.Trans.R.Soc.B
372:20160297
8
 on March 6, 2018http://rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org/Downloaded from 
During April–June 2015, the reported country weekly
case count declined to approximately 20 cases per week,
and fluctuated around this level until a further decrease at
the end of July. Transmission remained concentrated in and
around the western districts of Conakry and Forecariah, but
with cases re-emerging elsewhere, for example in Dubreka
and Boke. During August, Guinea reported only a few
cases per week, focused around Conakry and Coyah; and
13 September 2015 marked the end of the first week during
which no new cases were documented. However, a small
number of additional intermittent cases were reported in
the Forcariah district between mid-September and late
October [5].
Guinea was first declared Ebola-free on 29 December 2015
after a 42 day period without new cases [5]. However, on 16
March 2016, within the 90 day high-level surveillance period,
Guinean health officials reported three deaths with symptoms
consistent with Ebola in the village of Koropara (N’Ze´re´kore´
prefecture) [43,44]. Investigators from the Ministry of Health,
WHO, the US Centres for Disease Control (CDC), and
UNICEF arrived the following day. Samples were taken
from four contacts of the deceased and two tested positive
for Ebola (the mother and sister of one of the deceased).
Cases were rapidly admitted to a treatment facility together
with rapid mobilization of epidemiologists, surveillance
experts, vaccinators, social mobilizers, contact tracers and an
anthropologist as part of the interagency response team.
Guinea was again declared Ebola-free on 1 June 2016 [5].
Despite ultimately having the lowest confirmed number of
cases and deaths of the threeWest African countries with major
outbreaks, Guinea witnessed 2543 Ebola deaths among 3811
cases (confirmed, probable, and suspected), 3351 of which
were laboratory-confirmed cases [5]. Of the 34 districts in
Guinea, 24 were affected by Ebola, in contrast to both Liberia
and Sierra Leone in which every district reported cases [21].
(b) Liberia
The first cases of EVD were confirmed in Liberia on 30 March
2014, eight days after the outbreak was declared in Guinea:
two cases confirmed in Foya district, Lofa County, close to
the border with Guinea and Sierra Leone (figure 2) [45]
with RNA sequencing confirming that the virus was
imported from neighbouring Guinea [46].
The Liberian government responded to the outbreak by
forming a high-level National Task Force composed of the
WHO, UNICEF and multiple international non-governmen-
tal organizations (NGOs).2 Shortly after the formation of
this task force the CDC sent teams to assist the response
[27]. The initial response included enhanced surveillance,
contact tracing, training of medical staff, community aware-
ness campaigns, and supplying personal protective
equipment to health facilities [45].
Within two weeks, five other counties had reported sus-
pected cases: Margibi County, Bong, Nimba, Grand Cape
Mount, and Montserrado [27]. Within the first month of the
outbreak in Liberia 13 cases were confirmed, of which 11
died [47]. The initial wave of infection was effectively con-
tained within Liberia with no new cases reported for nine
weeks between 6 April and 7 June [27]. Phylogenetic analysis
supports this, with no future samples of Ebola virus ident-
ified from the lineage responsible for the first wave of the
outbreak [48].
Believing the outbreak to be ‘relatively small’ [49], the
WHO and CDC began to withdraw from Liberia [50] despite
ongoing transmission in neighbouring Guinea and calls from
MSF that more support was required owing to the unprece-
dented geographical spread of the outbreak [51]. This
withdrawal later formed part of the wider criticism of the
international response to the outbreak [52].
A new laboratory-confirmed case of EVD was reported on
7 June 2014 in Foya district sparking the beginning of the
second wave of transmission in Liberia [27]. Evidence from
contact tracing and phylogenetic analysis suggests that the
virus was reintroduced from Sierra Leone as it was a distinct
viral lineage to previous cases in Liberia [48]. Genetic sequen-
cing suggests that it was this second distinct viral lineage that
was responsible for future intra-country spread, not the lineage
responsible for the first importation in March 2014 [48]. The
outbreak soon spread to Monrovia, the capital city where a
quarter of the country’s population live, and claimed the
lives of a nurse and the head surgeon from Redemption
Hospital, a reminder of the significant risk posed to HCWs
during Ebola outbreaks [53,54]. By the end of June 2014 107
suspected cases of EVDhadbeen reported inLiberia, including
52 laboratory-confirmed,with 65 deaths (in Lofa,Montserrado
and Margibi).
In July 2014, two ETCs opened in Monrovia and
Foya, run by the charity Samaritan’s Purse. Capacity was
minimal and centres filled quickly, the centre in Monrovia
having only 40 beds [51]. Within a month two American
volunteers were infected with Ebola—Samaritan’s Purse
subsequently suspended activities in the country and evacu-
ated its staff, with MSF stepping in to manage the ETCs [51].
July also saw the Liberian Government close most border
points and all schools in order to minimize transmission
[55]. Despite this, by the end of July, case numbers had
tripled and EVD had spread to seven of Liberia’s 15 counties
(including Lofa, Montserrado, Margibi, Bomi, Bong, Nimba,
and Grand Gedeh); there were 329 suspected cases and 156
deaths [27].
Transmission increased rapidly throughout August and
September 2014 (total cases 1082 and 3458, respectively),
and all but two counties reported cases. Additional ETCs,
run by MSF, Save the Children, International Medical
Corps, and the Liberian Ministry of Health (MOH), were
built but struggled to cope with the high volume of cases
[56]. The 120 bed ‘Island Clinic’ in Monrovia, built by
the Liberian MOH, reached capacity within 24 hours [57].
By early September, the total bed capacity in Liberia was
314, with an estimated deficit of 760 beds in Monrovia
alone [5].
— the possibility of sexual transmission (current evidence suggest that viable Ebola virus can persist in semen for at
least 82 days after symptom onset and possibly longer than six months)
— the possibility of a missed transmission chain
— the possibility of a new emergence event from an animal reservoir.
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October 2014 saw the largest number of new cases in a
month, with 3077 cases suspected or confirmed, nearly dou-
bling previous case counts [47]. All 15 counties had now
reported at least one confirmed case, with Montserrado,
Magibi, Bong and Nimba worst affected, while transmission
was decreasing in Foya [5].
In November 2014, the U.S. government proposed to
send $2.89 billion and deploy 3000 troops to West Africa,
with their response focused on Liberia [58,59]. This resulted
in the building of new ETCs, an increase in laboratory
capacity, air transport of supplies, and enhanced awareness
programmes. However, Ebola virus transmission decrea-
sed significantly before many of the ETCs had become
operational, with some ETCs treating no patients [59].
Mistrust between communities and authorities was a
common theme in all countries affected by the West African
outbreak. This was epitomized by protests in Liberia in mid--
August 2014. Residents of the West Point District tried to
dismantle an Ebola screening unit which they viewed as
a risk to their safety. This lead to violent clashes between
soldiers and protesters and the eventual quarantining of the
whole West Point District [60]. Mistrust of the government,
as well as fear of stigmatization, led some to avoid
seeking medical help for suspected EVD and reluctance to
engage in surveillance and contact tracing [56]. In a heavy-
handed response, the Liberian Government made it illegal
to conceal an Ebola-infected patient, punishable by a prison
sentence of 2 years [61].
The peak in reported cases occurred in September 2014, but
by late 2014 transmission had begun to decrease. By early Janu-
ary 2015, nine months after the first reported cases in Liberia,
approximately 150 new cases were being reported per week,
with transmission limited to two counties: Montserrado and
Grand Cape Mount [47]. Effective contact tracing and monitor-
ing were now well established; all registered contacts were
being monitored daily, and 100% of new confirmed cases were
occurring among known contacts [5].
The first week of March 2015 was the first week with no
new reported cases of EVD in Liberia. One additional case
was confirmed in Monrovia later in March but led to no
additional subsequent infections. Forty-two days later, on 9
May 2015, Liberia was declared Ebola-free [5].
LiberiawasdeclaredEbola-free threemore times, after small
clusters of infection in June 2015, November 2015 and April
2016. The first of these clusters was of six confirmed cases
near Monrovia. Genomic sequencing suggested re-emergence
from an EVD survivor in Liberia rather than cross-border
spread [5]. The second cluster occurred in Monrovia among
three members of the same family. This was also attributed to
long-term viral carriage in a survivor. The final cluster occurred
in April 2016 and was thought to have been imported from
Guinea when a woman travelled to Monrovia from Macenta,
Guinea, to visit relatives after the death of her husband from
EVD. The virus spread to her two sons, but with rapid diagno-
sis, contact tracing, early treatment and isolation in an ETC, the
virus did not spread further [62]. Liberia was again declared
Ebola-free on 9 June 2016. The total number of confirmed,
probable, and suspected cases in Liberia was 10 678 (3151
laboratory-confirmed), with 4810 deaths [47].
(c) Sierra Leone
EVD was first confirmed in Sierra Leone on 25 May 2014 [63].
The first case was a young woman in Kenema, Sierra Leone’s
third largest city, 50 km from the Liberian border and 100 km
from the border with Guinea. Given the situation in neigh-
bouring countries, Sierra Leone had already begun an
enhanced surveillance programme based in the Lassa fever
isolation ward in Kenema General Hospital [64]. Within a
month of the outbreak being confirmed in Sierra Leone,
over 150 people were reported infected [47] and case num-
bers appeared to be increasing rapidly. The government
declared a state of emergency in the ‘eastern hub’ of
Kenema and neighbouring Kailahun on 12 June 2014
and WHO reinforced its representation in-country from
mid-June [65]. Within six months of the first reported case,
the outbreak in Sierra Leone peaked (November 2014) with
up to 150 people a week being infected [47].
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Figure 3. Initial transmission chain in Guinea. HCW, healthcare worker. (Adapted from Baize et al. [29] and Coltart et al. [30].)
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The steep gradient of the early part of the epidemic
curve hints at a ‘slow and silent’ undetected early phase to the
outbreak in Sierra Leone [66]. Retrospective analyses suggest
that the Ebola virus was introduced to Sierra Leone from
Guineamore than fivemonths before the first officially reported
case. This analysis identified a female who travelled from
Box 3. Key facts about traditional burial practices—why do we need safe burials? (Adapted from WHO and National Geographic [32,33].)
† Purpose of burial rituals
The purpose of the burial rituals are threefold:
1. to honour the dead relatives in the traditional way
2. to say good-bye
3. to accommodate the deeply held beliefs about the obligations of the living to the dying and dead, respecting the cul-
tural view of life after death.
† Ceremony rituals
— Many tribal ceremony rituals are closely held secrets, therefore, they are not well documented. However, one of the main
rituals common to all groups is the washing of (with bare hands) and spending time with the dead body, which is highly
infectious in the case of Ebola. Both of these traditions lead to enhanced transmission of infection and thus, highlight the
need for safe burial practices.
— Burial ceremony traditions depend on tribe and religion. The populations affected by the Ebola outbreak consisted mainly
of Christians and Muslims:
(i) Christians close the eyelids, wash and dress the deceased
(ii) Muslims wash the dead as well, then wrap the deceased in a white cloth
— Special circumstances:
(i) Tribal leaders: additional rituals are undertaken to transfer powers to a successor
(ii) Pregnancy: many cultural groups feel that the fetus needs to be removed from the mother’s body before burial to
prevent disturbing the world’s natural cycles
(iii) Some tribal rituals involve animal sacrifice, or inspecting the dead body to determine if the deceased had been a
witch—if so, the spirits must be rendered innocuous before burial
— If not undertaken properly, there are consequences for both the deceased and the living relatives, for example the dead are
thought to wander the earth eternally and plague the community if they do not reach the village of the dead.
† WHO protocol for the management of a safe and dignified burial includes:
— always take into account cultural and religious concerns and obtain family consent in burial plans
— only trained personnel should handle remains during the outbreak
— use Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)
— place the body in the body bag
— place the body bag in a coffin where culturally appropriate
— sanitize family’s environment
— remove PPE, manage waste and perform hand hygiene
— transport the coffin or the body bag to the cemetery
— burial at the cemetery: place coffin or body bag into the grave
— engaging community for prayers as this dissipates tensions.
† Challenges to implementing safe burial
One of the main challenges in implementing safe burial practices during this epidemic was finding culturally acceptable
methods in accordance with safety procedures. Genuine and open collaboration was required between political, health,
tribal and religious leaders. WHO published the new protocols for safe and dignified burials in October 2014, designed in
conjunction with affected communities, recognizing the need for the family and religious engagement. Examples of adap-
tations to burial practices used in the Ebola outbreak include:
— For deceased Muslims, shrouding the body in white body bags rather than the traditional white cotton [33]
— Guidance given by religious leaders suggesting alterations to traditional rituals, e.g.
(i) not to wash the corpse, with some suggesting dry ablutions (performed in PPE) instead
(ii) praying for the deceased in absentia was sufficient—this was believed to be acceptable as it occurred in historical out-
breaks documented in the scriptures.
— Burial workers would try to honour reasonable requests from families of the deceased, e.g.
(i) burial workers dressed in protective suits were permitted to dress the dead in outfits chosen by family before the
corpses were placed in body bags
(ii) money and jewellery or other sentimental items were allowed to be placed in body bags with the corpse as a ‘toll’ as
some traditions believe the deceased must pay to cross over to the village of the dead
(iii) brief prayers were allowed for loved ones, either while standing two meters (6.5 feet) from the white body bag before
removal for burial, or at the grave site after burial.
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Meliandou,Guinea to Sierra Leone and subsequently died from
EVD in January 2014 [66]. Further genomic analysis suggests
two distinct linages of Ebola virus were introduced into Sierra
Leone from Guinea in early 2014 [64].
MSF opened the first ETC in Sierra Leone in Kailahun in
mid-June with diagnostic support from Public Health Canada.
Like many ETCs at this stage of the outbreak, this facility was
rapidly overwhelmed. Further beds were provided in the
Lassa fever isolation ward at Kenema District Hospital, which
was uniquely placed to deal with the emerging threat of EBV.
However, this too was overwhelmed by the sheer number of
cases and it was forced to move patients into general medical
wards where isolation and infection control were inadequate.
More than 40 HCWs from this hospital were infected in 2014
[67], with many of them dying, including Sierra Leone’s only
national expert on haemorrhagic fevers [68].
By mid-2014, the UK Government took an active role in
supporting the National Ebola Response in Sierra Leone.
Together with NGOs such as Save the Children, it provided
four ETCs with 700 beds in major urban centres, including
one specifically for HCWs infected with EVD, which was
led by the British military [69].
Once the virus was established within Sierra Leone, mol-
ecular epidemiological evidence suggests that sustained
human-to-human transmission occurred within the country,
rather than through repeated cross-border reinfections or
recurrent zoonotic events [70]. Ebola virus appears to have
spread long distances following major roads networks,
whereas many smaller chains of transmission went unnoted
and uncontrolled in remote, isolated villages [71]. Just as the
outbreak in one area was thought to be coming under control,
these undetected links surfaced in new geographical areas,
causing wave-like spread across the country from east to west.
By September 2014, sustained transmission was reported
in the densely populated capital, Freetown [72]. The spread
from the eastern hub to Freetown, which resulted in intense
transmission, marked a serious escalation in the outbreak
[73]. The government of Sierra Leone, out of ‘a desperate
need to step up [their] response’ [74], began a range of
measures aimed at containing the outbreak. A state of emer-
gency was declared and a 3 day national lockdown was
imposed in September 2014. The lockdown was designed
not only to decrease the movement of people, but also to
give HCWs time to identify new cases and increase aware-
ness of EVD through door-to-door campaigns [75].
Subsequently, quarantine restrictions were put in place in
high-risk areas; curfews were imposed, including in Free-
town, lasting anywhere from 21 days to several months,
with restriction of movements between 18.00 and 06.00
daily; schools and other public places were closed; all large
gatherings including sporting events were cancelled [76];
and screening at land borders was strengthened [66].
Mass quarantine proved controversial—at one point one
third of the population of Sierra Leone was under quarantine
[77]. The president acknowledged the situation as ‘difficult’
[78], although this significantly underplays the nature of the
food shortages that affected some of the quarantined areas
and forced people to break quarantine [79]. Aside from the
ethical concerns, many felt that mass quarantine measures
were ineffective for Ebola as patients are not infectious until
they become symptomatic [80], and they may have been
counterproductive by preventing the free movement of
necessary medical supplies and personnel [81].
By October 2014, transmission had spread to the north-
ern district of Koinadugu, the last remaining Ebola-free
district of Sierra Leone [82]. However, by November 2014,
the outbreak in the eastern hub had begun to see reduced
transmission [73].
More HCWs were infected and died in Sierra Leone than
in any other country, both in absolute numbers and relative
(proportion of cases) terms [67]. Sierra Leone was the only
country in which there were strikes by frontline workers
because of working conditions and pay. In late 2014, burial
workers went on strike over unsafe working conditions and
a lack of hazard pay [83], in contrast to the relatively gener-
ous compensation paid to HCWs and their families in
Guinea [40]. In addition, doctors and nurses withdrew their
labour [66] seeking assurance that a new UK-built treatment
centre for HCWs would accept local, as well as international,
staff if they became infected [84].
Despite an apparently well-functioning contact tracing
system [85], cases continued in the north of the country
across the first half of 2015, in part fuelled by secret and
unsafe burials [86]. In June 2015, ‘Operation Northern Push’
was launched by the government of Sierra Leone, in collabor-
ation with international partners, to eliminate Ebola from
Port Loko and Kambia districts which were hotspots of trans-
mission [87]. This included the imposition of curfews in both
districts (12 June 2015), enhanced surveillance, active contact
tracing, intense community engagement and mass quaran-
tine. With these intense response strategies, the outbreak in
Sierra Leone appeared to be coming under control, but
despite the strictness of Operation Northern Push [88] new
chains of transmission proved stubbornly resistant to detec-
tion. News of a case in Kambia in September 2015—three
weeks after the last reported case and with no link to any
known chain of transmission—led to a flurry of activity,
including the first trial of ring vaccination in Sierra Leone
for Ebola virus [89]. This was in addition to vaccine trials
for frontline workers undertaken in Sierra Leone [90].
After this concerted effort, in November 2015, one year on
from the epidemic peak, Sierra Leone was declared free of
Ebola virus [91]. However, two months later in January
2016, a 22-year old woman died of EVD and her carer was
subsequently found to be infected. Applying many of the les-
sons from the previous 18 months, the public health system
responded rapidly and effectively, quickly containing the
flare-up and preventing spread. Four months later, and
almost 2 years after the first confirmed infection, Sierra
Leone was again declared Ebola-free on 17 March 2016 [92].
The outbreak in Sierra Leone claimed the lives of
3956 persons and is believed to have infected 14 124 (8706
laboratory-confirmed cases) [47]. Sierra Leone is now the
country with the largest number of Ebola cases in history.
(d) Other countries affected
Several other neighbouring countries had confirmed Ebola
infections during this period, all with epidemiological and
genetically proven links to the outbreaks in Guinea, Liberia
and Sierra Leone. However, only Nigeria and Mali had foci
of local transmission. There was also importation of infections
to several European countries and the USA, linked to theWest
African outbreaks, and in the USA and Spain isolated local
transmission also occurred to HCWs. Table 3 highlights the
Ebola infections diagnosed outside Guinea, Liberia and
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Sierra Leone by country. In addition, other countries also
accepted evacuated cases fromWest Africa for hospitalization
including Germany, France, Switzerland, The Netherlands
and Norway. There was also the coincidental, but unrelated,
outbreak in DRC which occurred at the same time.
5. Outbreak: propagation and failure to control
Social, biological and structural drivers of transmission
combined during the 2013-2016 outbreak to allow a perfect
storm with unprecedented and devastating consequences
[103]. This was exacerbated by a failure in the response at
both national and international levels. Table 4 outlines
the key factors leading to the failure in controlling the out-
break. This section discusses these factors in more detail,
with specific focus on the role of interventions on limiting
outbreak size.
(a) Population structure/geography
Emerging diseases such as Ebola often arise from close
animal contact at the zoonotic interface. Therefore, it is
common for outbreaks to occur in isolated rural areas, and
most previous Ebola outbreaks have remained contained in
these settings. In the initial phases of this outbreak, disease
transmission went undetected and likely led to chains of
transmission within the Kissi tribal area that spans the bor-
ders of Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone (figure 4). The
local population is mobile across these three countries, the
borders of which are porous, and as a result it accounted
for the vast majority of early cases in this outbreak.
Failure to control transmission in the early phases of the out-
break allowed mobile populations and migration to spread
transmission chains from rural to urban areas. Recent studies
estimate that population mobility in the major affected
countries is seven times higher than elsewhere in the world,
thought to be caused by poverty driving mobility as people
Table 3. Cases diagnosed outside of West Africa related to this outbreak.
no. cases no. deaths dates of outbreak details
Nigeria [93] 20 8 23 July 2014–19
October 2014
index case travelled by air from Liberia. Local transmission to 19
people (12 ﬁrst generation cases, 3 waves of transmission)
total country case count (diagnosed and evacuated): 20
Mali [94–96] 8 6 24 October 2014–18
January 2015
two importations:
1. October 2014: 2-year old girl from Guinea whose father was
a Red Cross worker who died—no local transmission
2. November 2014: Iman from Guinea, thought to have partaken
in traditional burial ritual ceremonies across the border in Sierra
Leone. Local transmission occurred and six others infected
phylogenetic analysis conﬁrms these were two separate
introductions [97]
total country case count (diagnosed and evacuated): 8
USA [98] 4 1 30 September
2014–21
December 2014
two episodes:
1. Liberian national visiting family in Dallas—local transmission
to two HCWs
2. HCW returned from Guinea—no local transmission
total country case count (diagnosed and evacuated): 4
Spain [99] 1 0 6 October 2014–2
December 2014
nurse caring for a repatriated HCW
N.B. HCW diagnosed in Sierra Leone—local transmission occurred to
nurse in Madrid. A second HCW was repatriated from Liberia, but
no local transmission occurred
total country case count (diagnosed and evacuated): 3
UK [100] 1 0 29 December
2014–10 March
2015
HCW returned from Sierra Leone (multiple hospital admissions for
Ebola)—no local transmission
N.B. two other cases were repatriated from Sierra Leone after
diagnosis and cared for in UK—no local transmission
total country case count (diagnosed and evacuated): 3
Senegal [101] 1 0 29 August 2014–17
October 2014
traveller from Guinea—no local transmission
total country case count (diagnosed and evacuated): 1
Italy [102] 1 0 12 May 2015–20
July 2015
HCW returned from Sierra Leone—no local transmission
total country case count (diagnosed and evacuated): 1
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look for work or food [104]. The increasing connectivity of dis-
tant rural communities [85] means that outbreaks of emerging
diseases are more likely than ever to reach densely populated
centres [105,106] such as Freetown, Monrovia, and Conakry.
These major cities provide hubs for international spread
[107–109] given that the world is increasingly globalized and
infections do not respect national borders [109].
(b) Lack of infrastructure
Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone are among the poorest
countries in the world, and have only recently emerged from
civil wars. Their damaged health infrastructure was ill-
equipped to deal with the scale of this outbreak. Pre-outbreak,
HCW capacity was already critically low at approximately one
or two HCWs per 100 000 population (table 2), and this was
further diminished by the epidemic [23,104].
The non-specific nature of EVD means fast and accurate
laboratory diagnosis is essential, yet in rural West Africa
both laboratory and human resource capacity was limited. In
the initial stages this led to timely response mechanisms
being hindered by a lack of diagnostic facilities. Furthermore,
road systems, transportation and telecommunications
networks were weak in all three countries, especially in rural
settings. This delayed the transportation of patients and diag-
nostic samples and the dissemination of public information
campaigns [104]. For example, in some settings, clinical
samples had to be transported across large geographical
areas with poor transport infrastructure, meaning diagnostic
confirmation often took several days.
(c) Cultural factors
(i) Burial practices
High-risk behaviours and lack of infection control measures
around death and traditional burial practices have long
been known to propagate transmission events [85]. During
August 2014, 60% of new infections in Guinea were linked
to funeral practices, with 80% linked to traditional burials
in Sierra Leone in November 2014 [104]. One funeral alone
is thought to have begun a huge chain of transmission with
several hundred infections [110].
Safe burials were, therefore, integral to the Ebola
response—modelling based on the outbreak in Liberia
suggested that interrupting funeral transmission could have
Table 4. Factors leading to failure to control the outbreak.
factors
population structure/geography mobile populations
rural to urban migration affecting densely populated areas
zoonotic emergence event at the intersection of three countries and near a road network
porous national borders (ﬁgure 4)
multicountry spread
economic factors/lack of infrastructure fragile states following recent civil wars
lack of trust in government following historic corruption
weak health systems
road networks along which infection spreads
poor transportation networks
poor telecommunication networks
international air links
lack of vehicles to access remote sites
cultural and behavioural factors traditional burial rituals
dependence on traditional healers
secret societies
community resistance, fuelled by lack of trust and disregard to cultural sensitivities at times
conspiracy theories, e.g. hiding cases
civil disobedience
interventions/failure in response delayed identiﬁcation
delayed and poorly coordinated international response
weak governance and lack of local accountability within national/local response
lack of evidence on effectiveness of interventions
lack of experience in managing an outbreak on this scale
lack of communication
shortages of HCWs
healthcare associated spread augmenting outbreak
initial lack of community engagement and public information
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had the greatest potential impact of all interventions on out-
break prevention [111]. Despite this, repeated assessments
revealed widespread risks in funerals including a lack of
trained burial teams, a shortage of burial space, no clear
guidelines on collecting diagnostic specimens from the
deceased, and a lack of community engagement to facilitate
culturally acceptable safe burials [112].
Funerals in eastern Sierra Leone, for example, are steeped
in cultural significance; the strong sense of family and local
allegiances, often tied together by marriages and dowries,
are thought to have allowed these remote communities to
survive through civil war when government safety nets
were non-existent. The practice of taking wives from distant
villages saw sisters and close female relatives travelling
long distances in order to wash the body of women who
died from Ebola according to the Muslim tradition (box 3),
providing an important social pathway that facilitates the
spread of Ebola to new geographical areas [85]. This was
compounded by widowers travelling back to their deceased
wife’s home village to complete any outstanding dowry pay-
ments though labour, providing further opportunity for
onward disease transmission [85].
New standard operating procedures developed by WHO
(box 3) were insufficient alone to successfully reduce risk
behaviours during funerals; it was only when these social
pathways were recognized, acknowledged and addressed
that the number of safe and dignified burials met international
guidelines and the epidemic curve began to fall [113].
(d) Interventions
Prior to this outbreak, the mainstay of interventions to combat
Ebola outbreaks were contact tracing and follow-up for
exposed contacts, prompt treatment and isolation of suspected
and confirmed cases, strict infection control, and safe burial,
underpinned by a strong commitment to community engage-
ment [114]. These measures continued to be effective during
the 2013–2016 outbreak, and the epidemic confirmed
knowledge and protocols established from previous outbreaks.
However, progress in understanding the exact benefit of
each intervention is limited owing to a lack of evidence; the
decline in cases across all countries coincidedwith simultaneous
implementation of multiple interventions and disentangling the
role of each requires further study. For example, many interven-
tions were part of an ‘improved package’ in Ebola treatment,
where treatment beds and improved community-based
infection control were implemented in tandem [115].
(i) Community engagement
Central to all interventions was the need to work with
affected communities not only to effectively serve their
needs [116], but also to enable the development and
implementation of culturally acceptable strategies. As
described throughout this paper, a failure to engage commu-
nities early enough had a detrimental effect on this outbreak
response, but when effectively engaged, community inter-
ventions played a significant role in curtailing the
outbreak. The three affected West African countries have cul-
tures of strong community connectedness, with trust for
community leaders far greater than that of government
[117], exacerbated by recent civil unrest. Acknowledging
these social structures and working alongside community
networks proved essential for effective outbreak response.
Mistrust between the implementing organizations and indi-
viduals directly impacted the effectiveness of surveillance,
contact tracing, healthcare seeking behaviour, and safe burial
initiatives; all individually propagating the spread of the virus
[118,119]. Conversely, where achieved, community engagement
with strong international support was integral to controlling
Ebola; modelling of the outbreak in Liberia concluded that the
increase in bed capacity, creditedwith causing a reduction indis-
ease incidence, was insufficient to bring case numbers down
without significant public engagement [120].
Drawing on conversations with communities in the most
affected countries, local experts and international actors, the
main steps identified in achieving community engagement
in Ebola response efforts include: identifying both male and
female community leaders to champion key messages;
organizing regular community meetings; using varied
communication methods; tailoring global policies to local
settings; and involving family members in care actions
which do not expose them to increased risk [121].
Effective community engagement benefited policy-
making: strategies designed when incorporating cultural
values, customs and concerns of affected communities were
more effective [121]. Implementation also benefited: at var-
ious stages of this outbreak, transmission was fuelled by a
reluctance of populations to seek care in designated facilities,
to engage in adequate contact tracing, to respect quarantine
regulations, or to reveal deaths in order to allow safe burial
[104]—all of which improved after programmes of commu-
nity engagement [122]. Examples of successful interventions
included communities buying megaphones to counter
myths related to infection and to encourage people to seek
treatment instead of hiding from authorities [59].
All other policies outlined below must, therefore, be
viewed not as isolated technical interventions, but as part
of a wider programme of disease control activities, with
community engagement chief among these.
(ii) Contact tracing
The ability to identify, and subsequently interrupt, chains of
transmission is crucial to the success of containment efforts,
Kenema
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Figure 4. Where the outbreak began—map to show Kissi tribal area
spanning Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia. (Online version in colour.)
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and the success of contact tracing is, like all Ebola interven-
tions, determined by the extent to which communities trust
and give accurate information to those attempting to curb
the outbreak [123].
One proxy indicator as to the success of contact tracing is
the proportion of new confirmed cases who were already
being monitored as contacts of known, existing Ebola cases.
These contacts can then be followed up with temperature
checks for the 21 day incubation period and receive prompt
isolation if diagnosed with Ebola, thereby improving treat-
ment outcomes and reducing exposure to further potential
contacts. In fact, modelling from early in the outbreak in
Sierra Leone and Liberia identified that contact tracing
(with prompt isolation and infection control) could have a
more substantive effect on the epidemic than even potentially
curative medical therapies [124]. Despite this, evidence from
Guinea and Sierra Leone suggested that contact tracing was
far from adequate at this time—as a result, few new cases
were from identified contacts and chains of transmission
proved stubbornly difficult to interrupt [119,125]. Alternative
approaches focusing on community-based early detection
over contact tracing proved more effective in simulations
based on epidemic data [126]. In contrast, the rapid public
health response to the various ‘tail end’ epidemics across
the region involved effective contact tracing and a high pro-
portion of secondary cases had been identified and
followed up as contacts prior to their diagnosis with EVD.
(iii) Infection prevention and control measures
Effective infection control inhealthcare facilities is acrucial step in
interrupting chains of transmission. Lack of knowledge and
resources to provide effective infection controlweremajor factors
leading to an amplification of this outbreak. Transmission was
propagated by HCWs who became infected and who inadver-
tently spread infection to their family members and
communities, particularly in the early phase of this outbreak
[30], in a similar pattern to historic outbreaks [2,8,30]. Early in
the outbreak, the relative risk for acquiring EVD was around
100 times higher for HCWs compared with the general popu-
lation [127], although this risk decreased as barrier precautions
were more effectively implemented, and personal protec-
tive equipment became available [128]. This is a tragic reminder
of the risks frontline HCWs face in weakened and understaffed
healthcare systems.
In an effort to strengthen infection prevention and control
(IPC) practices, a partnership between Ministries of Health,
CDC, WHO and others was established in August 2014 to
improve IPC at non-ETC healthcare facilities and to decrease
the risk for Ebola transmission to HCWs. National IPC
plans were developed and published in each country by late
2014, with IPC task forces established to coordinate infection
control efforts. However, progress was slow. For example, in
October 2014, in Sierra Leone, almost five months after the
first reported case and despite infection control teams being
deployed, major gaps in IPC practices remained. None of
the six Sierra Leonean districts visited by a CDC-led monitor-
ing team had standard operating procedures or adequate
equipment [129]. Progress was hindered by delays in import-
ing personal protective equipment and a lack of engagement
with community partners [121]. Thus, effective implemen-
tation on the ground was impossible despite extensive
training [130].
(iv) Ebola treatment centres and bed capacity
The lack of bed capacity in ETCs to isolate and treat patients
resulted in a massive inpouring of support to increase treat-
ment facilities. Offering patients care with stringent
infection control, supported by accurate PCR diagnosis,
increased willingness to be hospitalized and facilitated con-
tact tracing. ETCs have been integral in the control of
previous outbreaks, though never before have they been
deployed on this scale [131]. However, the role of increasing
bed capacity in controlling the outbreak remains controver-
sial. Modelling from the CDC in September 2014 indicated
that 70% of all Ebola cases would need treatment in ETCs
to begin to curb the outbreak [132], necessitating a huge
scale-up in the provision of ETCs from the international com-
munity [133]. MSF had been operating several of the early
ETCs, and several other players began to take an active role
in providing more ETCs across all three countries.
The UN Mission for Ebola Emergency Response set a
target of two ETC beds per suspected or confirmed case.
This target was eventually met in January 2015 [134], but by
this time the peak of the outbreak had passed and case num-
bers were already on the decline in most areas across the three
countries. Despite this, several reports suggest that this
intervention was perhaps the most crucial in controlling the
outbreak [115,135], whereas others acknowledge that it
occurred too late in the outbreak evolution to have significant
impact [115,136]. Part of this discrepancy may be explained by
the assumption in certain mathematical models that admission
to ETCs led to near-perfect isolation of infected individuals
[137]. Furthermore, constructing an ETC and training the
relevant staff is a timely process, at a crucial time when a
single week can make a big difference to the disease burden.
Therefore, future outbreak response should begin construction
of required ETCs early to maximize impact.
(v) Quarantine
Some interventions though appeared to be ineffective and
sometimes even counterproductive. Epidemiological model-
ling provided little evidence to support the use of mass
quarantines [138] by incorporating the evidence that when
patients are asymptomatic they are not infectious [81]. For
example, modelling after the Liberian West Point quarantine
suggested it had little effect in bringing down the basic repro-
ductive number (R0) [111]. Additionally, the quarantine of
HCWs from high-income countries, as established by
New York and New Jersey, was done with the aim to
reduce risk, but its major impact appears to have been to
dissuade other volunteers from travelling to West Africa [81].
(vi) Intervention summary
Given the limited resources, efforts were rightly focused on
outbreak response and clinical care, rather than scientific
advancement and research. As a result, we continue to lack
sufficient data to inform a robust, evidence-based approach
to control Ebola outbreaks and to determine how, when and
in what order to deploy interventions. Prospectively collected
data on outbreak response is sparse, preventing rigorous
evaluation of the impact of the response on both incidence
and the relative merits of each intervention [115]. The assess-
ment of specific interventions was further limited by the
contemporaneous introduction of many of the major strat-
egies. It is likely that no single intervention was responsible
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for reversing the epidemic curve [136], but en masse the tra-
ditional control measures instituted appeared ultimately to
help.
The limited public health infrastructures within the
affected countries contributed to the failure to implement tra-
ditional public health measures early enough to deal with the
scale of the outbreak. The shortcomings of these responses
were compounded by the lack of cultural and contextual
knowledge among the high-level international response. It
appears that one of the key factors in controlling the outbreak
was the successful engagement of communities to help over-
come cultural barriers and to pass on educational messages
about the importance of infection reporting, contact tracing
and safe burial. Once communities understood that they
were able to contribute to the response, successful implemen-
tation of all interventions increased.
Most of the progress in knowledge regarding successful
interventions occurred via a process of elimination, i.e. by
excluding interventions that did not play a crucial role in curb-
ing case numbers based on timing of implementation (ETCs,
vaccines and therapeutics). The proven interventions—exhaus-
tive contact tracing, strict infection control measures (during
burials and in healthcare settings) and community engage-
ment—are not novel strategies. All were established
during the response to the first Ebola outbreak of 1976 and
they remain the mainstay of Ebola control today
[116,120,121,139,140]. These traditional public health measures
remain critical and need to be communicated and reinforced
early on during future epidemics, especially in resource-poor
settings. The response to this outbreak failednot in thedevelop-
ment or deployment of novel technologies, but in the prompt
recognition by global organizations of the scale of the outbreak.
Box 4 suggests 10 components of an effective Ebola response
based on our research for this article. They are in no particular
order, and incorporate both practical solutions for which some
evidence exists and recommendations from expert bodies.
(e) Failure of response leadership
There has been much speculation and criticism regarding the
timing and delay of both the national and international
responses, with WHO in particular singled out for criticism
[52]. This crisis exposed organizational failings in the func-
tioning of WHO leading to a ‘significant and unjustifiable
delay occurring in the declaration of a Public Health
Emergency of International Concern’ [141]. The WHO has
already accepted the need for transformation of organiz-
ational culture and delivery, but this will not be enough to
prevent and mitigate future outbreaks—Member States
must also transform to ensure full political support for imple-
menting the core capacities for public health outlined in the
International Health Regulations (IHRs; see below).
The scale of the outbreak was underestimated by experts
andminimizedbyauthorities.Although somekey international
players were quick to respond, the early phase of the outbreak
was marred by resources being quickly overwhelmed and the
inability of local public health infrastructure to cope with the
rapidly amplifying case load. Guinea, Liberia and Sierra
Leone had a shortage of public health surveillance capacities
to detect, report and respond rapidly to the outbreak. The
response was hampered by a lack of trained and experienced
personnel willing to be deployed to West Africa, inadequate
financial resources, a limited understanding of effective
response methods, ineffective community engagement and
poor coordination [141]. Furthermore, many suspect that the
lack of good governance and accountability at a national/
local level was a key factor in the genesis of the perfect storm
that was the 2013–2016 Ebola outbreak.
6. Further questions
In the writing of this paper, many crucial questions were ident-
ified which remain the unexamined part of the story. These
include: howmight one account for the different epidemiologi-
cal curves, geographical distributions, and mortality rates
across the three countries?; why did the outbreak not spread
more widely across porous borders to other neighbouring
countries?;what is the role ofprotective immunity in controlling
the outbreak?; is there any evidence for host genetic suscepti-
bility to infection?; would the outbreak have died out without
any intervention? This paper summarizes what is known and
hencewehavenot speculatedonanyof thesematters.However,
we would like to highlight how much more work there is to
complete before the outbreak can fully be understood.
7. Key successes
Overall, progress in our knowledge of EVD transmission
dynamics, control measures and management strategies has
been mixed. The limited research that did occur during the
outbreak was focused on novel solutions, e.g. vaccines and
therapeutics, rather than fully understanding traditional
public health measures or clinical management (e.g. fluid
and electrolyte balance). Areas of significant advancement
include: establishing a pipeline for clinical therapeutic trials
in emergency settings; vaccine and therapeutics develop-
ment; the incorporation of near real-time molecular
techniques into transmission dynamic studies; and the use
of modelling to assist in decision-making.
(a) Scientific progress
(i) Vaccine and therapeutics pipeline
Development of a process or ‘pipeline’, for rapid approval
and implementation of clinical trials in emergency settings:
this was one of the greatest advancements brought about
Box 4. Top 10 components of an effective Ebola response.
1. Early identification and recognition of outbreak.
2. Effective collaboration and coordination between
national and international players, with sound
governance.
3. Quick mobilization of professional and community
resources.
4. Improved communication and awareness.
5. Improved community engagement.
6. Training of HCWs in infection control.
7. Organization of contact tracing and isolation.
8. Good surveillance and case detection.
9. Safe burial practices.
10. Consideration of vaccination strategies based on the
latest evidence.
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by this outbreak—namely in relation to vaccines and thera-
peutics. The expedited ethical and regulatory approvals meant
that patients could benefit from the latest scientific treatments
without any meaningful delay. Although these vaccines/
treatments lack the robust evidence base that would normally
be required and hence are accompanied by potential risks,
their use is justified in situations with significant associated
mortality and limited opportunities to study the disease. This
provides the possibility of being able to provide potentially
life-saving treatments to some patients and to improve
knowledge of disease management for future outbreaks.
The clinical trials occurred too late to have any significant
impact on this outbreak, although they hold great promise
for the future. Vaccine development in particular has
been shown to be highly effective and safe [142–144] and
will undoubtedly be used as a key preventative strategy in
the future.
(ii) Molecular epidemiology
The use of cutting-edge molecular techniques: this was used in
two main ways. First, rapid PCR was made available for the
prompt and accurate diagnosis of suspected cases, facilitating
their early isolation. Second, this outbreak was one of the first
instances of real-time sequencing being used in an acute set-
ting to enhance outbreak understanding. For example:
— Real-timegenetic sequencinghelped to identifyspecific clus-
ters that could then be linked to risk behaviours. The large
outbreak related to the funeral in Kenema, for example,
was mapped after sequencing the virus in infected patients,
and allowed future responses to be targeted to high-risk
‘super-spreading’ events [64]. Only when chains of trans-
mission were identified, using a combination of
conventional traditional field epidemiology and, later, cut-
ting-edge, near real-time molecular techniques, were those
infectious networks interrupted.
— Genomic surveillance also helped to describe the outbreak
by facilitating an understanding of the origins of the out-
break and subsequent emergent clusters. Further,
phylogenetic trees constructed during and after the out-
break demonstrated that disease transmission was
almost exclusively within country, human-to-human
transmission, rather than repeated zoonotic events [64].
— Genetic sequencing also established that the Ebola out-
break in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2014 was
a result of a separate, unrelated zoonotic event [145].
Therefore, novel technologies can provide additional benefit
when used in tandem to supplement established strategies.
This highlights that there is a role for incorporating viral genetic
sequence data into the standard outbreak response toolkit, as it
allows epidemiologists responding to the outbreak to focus
their resources most effectively to interrupt transmission.
(iii) Mathematical models
The use of epidemiological models to assist complex decision-
making: a large range of models were developed during the
outbreak (described above) to inform decisions such as:
where to allocate scarce resources in real time [146]; how to
define the likely scope of the outbreak in the absence of control
measures [124]; how to describe ‘worst-case scenarios’ that
stimulated international organizations and national
governments to provide the necessary support; and how to
help differentiate between effective interventions and those
with limited utility [147]. A systematic review of mathematical
models of the West Africa Ebola outbreak has made recommen-
dations for further improvement of modelling in future
outbreaks, including a degree of standardization of techniques
to enable comparisons that could then be shared rapidly [148].
(b) Clinical aspects
Many of the clinical and research findings from the 2013–
2016 outbreak have helped confirm our prior knowledge of
EVD [111], but progress has been limited. The data confirm
previously documented incubation periods and the fact that
people are not infectious until after they become febrile,
giving additional support to the value of contact tracing,
quarantine with fever surveillance and early isolation for
possible and suspect cases [81].
Encouragingly, mortality rates did appear to decline
throughout the outbreak [149]. Nonetheless, we acknowledge
that this is subject to ascertainment bias of underreporting of
milder cases early in the outbreak, and the difficulty in calcu-
lating a crude fatality rate from the proportion of fatal cases
in the midst of the outbreak when the lag time between
case reporting and case recovery or death alters the results
[150]. It is possible that improved survival rates increased
confidence in the healthcare system, leading to increased
treatment seeking and better contact tracing, thus chains of
transmission were more rapidly identified and disrupted.
(c) Operational aspects
Finally, one of the most impressive aspects of the outbreak
response was the unprecedented levels of international col-
laboration and cooperation. The response was truly global
and included a diverse range of organizations and national
delegations from across the world, including NGO, humani-
tarian, military and governmental bodies. The global health
community should be indebted to all those who were
involved in this response, but especially to NGOs, including
MSF which first raised the alarm about the scale of this
Ebola outbreak, and a host of others that were integral in
establishing and maintaining an effective response.
8. Lessons learned
The response to the 2013–2016 Ebola outbreak in West Africa
has been the subject of numerous independent assessments
with four different panels convened to review the international
response, identify failures in the response and provide rec-
ommendations to strengthen future responses (box 5). All
four panels concluded that the slow response of the WHO
was a significant factor in the outbreak not being contained.
Recommendations common to all include enhanced global col-
laboration during outbreaks including global governance and
leadership, and the development of strong national core
capacity in public health across the globe, as agreed under
the IHRs [114]. The IHRs are negotiated global agreements
for stronger health security and require all countries to develop
and sustain eight core capacities in public health in order to
better detect and respond to hazards, including infectious dis-
ease outbreaks. They also mandate international cooperation
as a safety net when outbreaks spread across international
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Box 5. Summary of common recommendations from the four independent assessment panels.
† Independent assessment panels
— WHO Ebola Interim Assessment Panel [141]
— Harvard University and the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine’s Independent Panel on the Global Response to
Ebola [52]
— US National Academy of Medicine’s Commission on a Global Health Risk Framework for the Future [151]
— United Nations High-Level Panel on the Global Response to Health Crises [152].
† Recommendations
Preventing and responding to outbreaks
WHO’s role – WHO to:
— Re-establish leadership role as the guardian of global public health:
(i) WHO to lead outbreak response with Member States supporting WHO at the frontline by implementing core capa-
bilities in public health (surveillance, issuing alerts, and outbreak responses)
— Scale back its broad remit and refocus on providing technical support
— Create a dedicated ‘Centre for Emergency Preparedness and Response’ with strong technical expertise
— Create a Standing Emergency Committee with strengthened ability to independently identify health risks and declare
public health emergencies appropriately
— Ensure a protected budget and contingency fund to support this new centre and allow rapid deployment of emer-
gency response when required; this would include annual contributions from Member States, International
Monetary Fund, World Bank, and other multilateral donors
— Develop a plan to ensure core capacities required under IHR for all countries (with World Bank) including:
(i) strategies to ensure that governments invest in building core capacities to detect, report and respond rapidly to
outbreaks
(ii) new approach to staffing WHO country offices, ensuring the highest-level capacity for vulnerable countries (with
weak health systems and governance challenges)
— WHO and partners to ensure that appropriate community engagement is a core function of future health emergency
responses.
— Governance reforms to rebuild trust in WHO.
International Health Regulations (IHR) - IHR review committee to:
— Consider the possibility of an intermediate level alert to engage the international community at an early stage without
declaring a full Public Health Emergency of International Concern
— Consider incentives to encourage countries to notify public health risks to WHO (e.g. public commendations and/
or financing mechanisms to mitigate adverse economic effects), and disincentives to discourage countries from
instigating travel restrictions and limit trading without scientific justification or WHO recommendation.
Other mechanisms:
— Clear response mechanisms for coordination and escalation in health crisis, including mobilization of the UN system
for humanitarian crises, and cooperation with non-state actors including civil society organizations, the private sector
and the media
— Consideration of formalized regional and sub-regional level arrangements to enhance prevention of and response to
health crises.
Research: production and sharing of data, knowledge, and technology
— Develop a framework for research and development operations in outbreak settings to enable, accelerate and ensure
good governance. Timely roll out of successful results should also be encouraged. WHO should play a central
convening role
— Develop a worldwide financing facility for outbreak-relevant diagnostics, vaccines, therapeutics, and medical and
information technology (with no commercial incentives).
Governing the global system for preventing and responding to outbreaks
—Create an independent UN Accountability Commission to oversee the new response centre, monitor compliance with
the IHR’s Core Capacity requirements at a country level, and assess function in outbreak responses
— Create a UN Security Council led Global Health Committee to put global health issues at the centre of the global
security agenda and expedite high-level leadership
— WHO Executive Board should mandate good governance reforms at the country level, including establishing a free-
dom of information policy. They should have the capacity to challenge governments and hold them publically
accountable for protecting public health.
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borders, and pursuant to the Ebola outbreak, an international
committee was convened to assess the effectiveness of the IHR.
It is perhaps surprising to note thatmanyof the recommen-
dations suggested by these four panels and other experts
mirror the main conclusions from Heymann et al. after the
Kikwit outbreak over 20 years ago [153]. These include the
need for a stronger infectious disease surveillance (both
national and global); improved international preparedness to
provide support when similar outbreaks occur; coordinated
Ebola research (especially for valid diagnostic tests), better
patientmanagement procedures and identification of the natu-
ral reservoir. Wemust hope that after an epidemic of this scale,
these recommendations will now be heeded and enacted to
improve global health security going forward.
9. Conclusion
The 2013–2016 Ebola outbreak inWest Africa was described by
the WHO as an ‘old disease in a new context’ [104] owing to
the many unique aspects it displayed: it was the largest Ebola
outbreak in history, being larger than all others combined; it
was the longest in duration; it was the first with multicontinen-
tal spread, initially within Africa and then to Europe and North
America; and it was the first in which there was a pipeline of
clinical products that could be studied for effectiveness.
Although this outbreak was quantitatively many times
larger than previous outbreaks, it was not qualitatively differ-
ent, as the means of amplification and transmission were the
same as previously described. As a result, the control
measures designed and implemented in prior outbreaks
were crucial to the response, but the failure to implement
these in a timely manner had devastating consequences.
Therefore, it is clear that in future epidemics these old mess-
ages need reinforcing early and vocally.
In addition, this outbreak highlighted the crucial role of
early community engagement in implementing a successful
response. Moreover, although previously established
measures will remain the mainstay of control strategies, we
learned during this outbreak that novel technologies (e.g.
real-time sequencing) can provide additional benefit when
used in tandem to supplement established strategies.
The scale and duration of this outbreak provided a unique
opportunity to develop and test evidence-based protocols to
improve both basic supportive clinical management (e.g.
fluid and electrolyte treatments) and the implementation of
public health interventions. However, woefully little progress
was made in these areas and the same questions remain per-
tinent now as were raised after the Kikwit outbreak over 20
years ago [153]. Had the key lessons from historical outbreaks
been acted upon, thousands of lives could have been saved
during the 2013–2016 outbreak. In addition, this failure
resulted in a lack of scientific progress which in turn means
an opportunity has been missed to improve outcomes of
future outbreaks. This is, perhaps, one of the biggest failings
in the response. One can only hope that we have now learned
the lesson, and that the global community will both heed the
recommendations suggested and translate these into practical
solutions to make a difference going forward.
Although the initial outbreak response was slow and
inadequate, once established the response demonstrated unpre-
cedented and impressive levels of international cooperation
[154]. National governments and the global health community
should be indebted to all the organizations and individuals
who tookgreat personal risk and showedcourage in contributing
to the effective response. This outbreakwas also a salutary lesson:
collaborations and structures are in place andmust nowbe better
used to enable a rapid and effective national response to out-
breaks, while also providing a global safety net for response
when national efforts fail to prevent international spread.
Further, there is evidence that the IHR are working better: the
Emergency Committee of the IHR recommended to WHO to
declare the outbreak of Zika virus a global public
health emergencyof international concern inFebruary2016 [155].
While at the timeofwriting the 2013–2016outbreakofEbola
inWest Africa has been declared over,WHO continues to stress
that ‘Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea are still at risk of Ebola
flare-ups, largely due to virus persistence in some survivors,
and must remain on high alert and ready to respond’ [156].
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1To avoid confusion, it is important to note that all eight prefectures
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2The International Red Cross, Samaritan’s Purse, Pentecostal Mission
Unlimited-Liberia, CHF-WASH Liberia, PLAN-Liberia, UN FPA.
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